I presented a talk on UAVs, IoT, and Cybersecurity at the LISA conference in Boston on December 7th, 2016. The abstract for the talk was:
“Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) aka “drones” are all the rage—$500 UAVs are used in professional racing leagues and major corporations are building $100,000 UAVs to deliver packages and Internet connectivity. UAVs are slowly working their way into almost every commercial sector via operations, sales, manufacturing, or design.
sUAS—emphasis on the final “S”—are complex systems. The aerial platform alone often consists of a radio link, an autopilot, a photography sub-system, a GPS, and multiple other sensors. Each one of these components represents a cybersecurity risk unto itself and also when part of the larger system. Add in the ground control stations, the radio controller, and the video downlink system and you have a very complex computing environment running a variety of commercial, closed source, open source, and home brew software.
And yes, there is already malware specifically targeting drones.
During this presentation, we will walk through a typical operational workflow for a UAV, all of the components of a representative system, and through a possible risk assessment model for UAVs. Even if you are not working with UAVs, you should consider that UAVs are an instance of “the Internet of Things”—a collection of sensors and computing devices connected to each other and to the cloud designed to gather, distribute, and analyze data in a semi- or fully-autonomous manner.”
The slides may be found here: https://www.usenix.org/conference/lisa16/conference-program/presentation/kovar
The DOI (Department of the Interior) agrees to buy UAVs from 3DR, a U.S. firm. No similar announcement from DJI, lending credence to my earlier reporting (here and here) on an apparent decision not to buy DJI products, possibly due to cyber security concerns.
The quoted post, below, appeared on the Facebook group “Commercial sUAS Operators” on July 7th. It was taken down very rapidly and no further discussion on the topic appeared. I spoke with Dennis Bosak SSA this morning and he confirmed the statement as written. Any further details must be requested in writing.
Another story is circulating that the DOI has either retracted the ban or it was never in place. However no copy of that memo can be made available and Mr. Bosak stood by his statement as of 0730 this morning.
To summarize, the Department of the Interior is banning any internal use of DJI products due to concerns about the product’s automatic uploading of telemetry and other information to DJI servers during firmware updates.
Last year I developed a presentation on cyber security and consumer/commercial UAVs. In that presentation I noted that we are self selecting areas of interest – test crops, critical infrastructure, disaster sites, … – and sending highly detailed information about these sites to often poorly understood cloud infrastructure.
Apparently, according to this post, the Department of the Interior has also identified this risk. Worse, it appears that DJI products are automatically sending sensitive telemetry information to their own servers. As the following announcement notes, DJI is a Chinese firm and some conclusions must be considered.
Many applications collect profile and debugging information for legitimate purposes. Most of those applications give the user an opt-in option. DJI could quickly defuse this situation by releasing an update that provides this option while also demonstrating that all such communication has been terminated. Regaining the trust of their clients, and of the U.S. Government, may be more difficult.
DJI is just one vendor. There are many others, hardware, software, and service. What are these vendors doing with the data you are collecting about your potentially sensitive sites?
OAM – Office of Acquisition Management
DOI – Department of the Interior
OAM had a telecom this morning with the aviation manager at DOI.
During that conversation we learned that they have banned the use of DJI products (which include the popular Phantom and Inspire aircraft) as they discovered that their products record telemetry information, to include routes flown, altitudes, etc., and send that recorded information to DJI each time the aircraft is plugged into a computer to perform a software/firmware update. As DJI is a Chinese company the security issue is readily apparent.
OAM highly recommends that, before choosing any particular aircraft, from any manufacturer, especially those that might be used for sensitive purposes, that your technical people fully understand what information may be transmitted, to whom it might be transmitted to, and whether it matters to your program.
Please distribute this information as widely as possible.
Dennis Bosak SSA
Department of the Interior
Office of Law Enforcement and Security
1849 C Street NW
Washington DC 20240
Working with Greg Dominguez and Cindy Murphy, we updated my UAV Forensics presentation from last year to address the Phantom P3, it’s additional data sources, some new tools for analyzing data, and our first pass at JTAG analysis.
Greg and I gave the presentation at Techno Security in June and a PDF version is attached here: UAV Forensics -TS16-final distribution
After consulting with a UAV lawyer and an FAA representative, I believe that:
- Public Agencies (PAs) still have to operate under a COA
- PAs can also operate non-Public Agency Operations (PAOs) under Part 107.
See pages 61-68 of the Rule for details
If a PA wishes to examine the roof of the court house for hail damage, a Part 107 operator working for the PA can perform the task.
If a PA wishes to conduct a SAR mission, or fly a UAV in support of fire fighting operations, they need a COA or to contract with a 333 exempt operator with the appropriate COA.
Quoting from a widely distributed email. I work on one UAS ASTM effort to type Small UAS. Here are their other efforts. Of particular interest is F2908 “Specification for Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) for a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS).”
Small UAS Operations
ASTM International Committee F38 on Unmanned Aircraft Systems has recently approved seven new standards that cover all major facets of small unmanned aircraft systems operations, including design, construction, operation and maintenance requirements.
The following seven new ASTM standards, written for all sUAS that are permitted to operate over a defined area and in airspace defined by a nation’s governing aviation authority, have now been approved by F38:
F2908, Specification for Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) for a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS). F2908 defines minimum requirements for the aircraft flight manual, which provides guidance to owners, mechanics, pilots, crew members, airports, regulatory officials and aircraft and component manufacturers who perform or provide oversight of sUAS flight operations.
F2909, Practice for Maintenance and Continued Airworthiness of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS). F2909 establishes a practice for the maintenance and continued airworthiness of sUAS. Requirements for continued airworthiness, inspections, maintenance and repairs/alterations are included.
F2910, Specification for Design and Construction of a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS). F2910 defines the design, construction and test requirements for sUAS. In addition to general requirements, F2910 covers requirements for structure, propulsion, propellers, fuel and oil systems, cooling, documentation and other key areas.
F2911, Practice for Production Acceptance of Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS). F2911 defines production acceptance requirements for sUAS. Requirements covered include several aspects of production, system level production acceptance, quality assurance and documentation.
F3002, Specification for Design of the Command and Control System for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS). F3002 provides a consensus standard in support of an application to a nation’s governing aviation authority to operate an sUAS for commercial or public use. The standard focuses on command and control (C2) links, including a diagram of a C2 system and general requirements for C2 system components.
F3003, Specification for Quality Assurance of a Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS). F3003 defines quality assurance requirements for design, manufacture and production of small unmanned aircraft systems. Guidance is given to sUAS manufacturers for the development of a quality assurance program.
F3005, Specification for Batteries for Use in Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS). F3005 defines requirements for battery cells used in sUAS. Mechanical design and safety, and electrical design battery maintenance are primary battery-related areas that are covered.
“The introduction of these standards developed by F38 will help to provide a safe and appropriate path for near-term routine sUAS operations in airspace systems of the United States and other countries,” says Theodore Wierzbanowski, chairman F38.
Committee F38 encourages participation in its standards developing activities. “The user community for these standards is vast,” says Wierzbanowski. “Feedback on what works and what doesn’t during these early stages of sUAS operation is critical.”
F2908 is under the jurisdiction of F38.03 on Personnel Training, Qualification and Certification, and F2909 was developed by F38.02 on Flight Operations. The other five new standards are under the jurisdiction of F38.01 on Airworthiness.